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Abstract
We use the Mexican labor market structure to price the set of fringe benefits that
household heads receive when formally employed. We exploit longitudinal,
nationally-representative information on household heads who are formal, informal, or
switch status at least once in our data. Using monthly labor income and an efficient
markets hypothesis, we identify a standard linear model which accounts for
time-variant household heads’ characteristics and household level and time fixed
effects. Under the usual strict-exogeneity assumption, we find that the price of fringe
benefits is approximately 7.9% of the average monthly labor income of informal
workers, or $217 USD.
JEL Classification: D4; J3; J4
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1 Introduction
Most developing countries are characterized by the presence of a large informal sector or
large informal labor market (see Figure 1). Workers in this sector usually do not pay taxes,
have access to fringe benefits (i.e. social security and health care coverage), or fall under
any labor market regulation. The existence of this sector and its recent expansion in many
emerging economies has important implications for the functioning of labor markets and
for economic growth. In particular, a deeper understanding of what workers consider
when deciding which sector to join could greatly improve the efficacy of policies aimed
to increase formality.
How do informal workers price forgone fringe benefits? In this paper, we argue that,
in Mexico, informal workers are compensated for the value of lost benefits with higher
labor income. We identify the price of these benefits through an approach that combines:
i) the Mexican labor market structure, which had 58.3% informal workers in the period
2005–2013; ii) information on monthly labor income; iii) information on individuals who
switched from formality to informality or the other way around; and iv) an efficient
market hypothesis.
In particular, if markets are efficient, individuals with identical characteristics should
earn the same compensation (inclusive of fringe benefits) regardless of the labor market
to which they belong. In other words, if there is perfect mobility between the formal and
the informal labor markets, informal workers need to be compensated because there is no
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Figure 1 Share of informal workers by country. Note: this figure presents the share of individuals working
in the informal labor market by country for the year 2009 (source: Jutting and de Laiglesia (2009)).
law that guarantees them fringe benefits1. The compensation represents how much extra
labor income the informal workers get in return for not having fringe benefits. In this
paper, we take advantage of the panel structure of the Mexican labor data and exploit the
fact that 15% of the individuals switched from formality to informality between 2005 and
2013. After controlling for time-invariant characteristics, we rely on a efficient market
hypothesis and a strict exogeneity assumption to interpret the negative effect of formality
on labor income as the price of fringe benefits.
In countries such as Mexico, in which the informal sector is a large fraction of the labor
force, and workers continuously move from formality to informality and the other way
around, finding exogenous variation that will induce workers to reallocate from one labor
market to the other has proven to be a difficult task. However, one recent example is the
introduction of Seguro Popular, a program launched to provide health services to unin-
sured individuals. The program, at first, was thought to be reducing the cost of informality,
and its critics claimed that a large fraction of the population would switch from formal
to informal jobs. Surprisingly, studies have found evidence that the program did not sig-
nificantly increase informality (see Azuara and Marinescu 2013). In addition, despite the
fact that formal workers have health coverage, a large fraction of them have joined Seguro
Popular. Figure 2 shows that, since its introduction, both formal and informal enrollment
rates to the program, although at different levels, have followed similar trends.
Various papers analyze features of markets in which formal and informal labor coexist,
but there are few papers pricing fringe benefits2. Juarez: Are Informal Workers Compen-
sated for the Lack of Fringe Benefits? Free Health Care as an Instrument for Formality
(unpublished) and Olson (2002) ask related questions but focus on the female labor force.
The former estimates the compensation that poor informal female workers receive for the
lack of fringe benefits. The latter finds that married female workers accept lower wages in
exchange for health benefits.
Our data comes from the National Survey of Occupation and Employment (NSOE)
collected by theMexican government. The survey is nationally representative and collects
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Figure 2 Share of beneficiaries Seguro Popular, 2005–2013. Note: the graph shows the percent of
beneficiaries to Seguro Popular that belong to the formal and informal labor markets. Seguro Popular is the
most prominent component of the Mexican System of Social Protection in Health launched in 2003 to
provide health services to uninsured people. The data comes from the National Survey of Occupation and
Employment (NSOE).
quarterly information on several features of employment conditions for household heads
and their respective spouses as well as socio-demographic characteristics for the period
2005–2013; it has a rotating panel structure in which households are dropped after 5
observations.
Our estimates are calculated using the after-tax labor income based on the assumption
that workers consider after-tax labor income when choosing between the informal and
formal jobs. Our results indicate that the price of fringe benefits is large and statistically
different from zero.We consider these estimates to be relevant, not only to inform policies
aiming to increase labor productivity, but also those aimed to improve the employment
quality of informal workers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our data. Section 3
describes the formal and informal labor markets in Mexico and defines fringe benefits.
Section 4 presents our empirical findings, and Section 5 provides the interpretation and
implications of our results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The data we use comes from theNational Survey of Occupation and Employment (NSOE)
for the period 2005–2013. The survey is nationally representative and collects quarterly
information on several features of the employment conditions of heads of households and
their respective spouses as well as socio-demographic characteristics. It has a rotating
panel structure in which households are dropped after 5 observations. The questions are
identical in each wave of the survey. For the year 2013, only information for the first
quarter is available. Thus, we have an observation span of 33 quarters after 20043. In our
sample, 84% of the household heads are employed, 2% unemployed, and 14% are out of the
labor force. In this paper, we focus on the first sub-sample, the employed. In what follows,
we explain the map from the raw data to the variables used in our empirical analysis.
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2.1 Information on income
We use one question to construct the before-tax monthly labor income variable: “(in your
current job) how much do you currently earn?” In answering the question, household
heads can pick a time scheme between the options (i) monthly, (ii) every 15 days, (iii)
weekly, (iv) daily. If the individual answers that he earns on a time scheme other than the
monthly scheme, we multiply his reported income as follows: (i) every 15 days, times 2;
(ii) weekly, times 4.5; (iii) daily, times 30. By definition, only the formally employed house-
hold heads pay taxes or receive credits (individuals with income below a certain threshold
which–determined yearly–receive credits). Thus, we calculate an after tax monthly labor
income for each household head using the Mexican Government’s tax schedule. Figure 3
displays the time trend of this variable by employment sector.
For each household head, we observe the following directly from the survey: age,
spouse’s age, sex, schooling years, spouse’s schooling years, andmarital status. In addition,
we observe the labor force characteristics of the spouses (i.e., participation and employ-
ment). All of the variables are categorical except for schooling years, which is discrete and
takes values between 0 (no education) and 24 (final year of graduate school completed),
and age. Table 1 presents summary statistics for each variable. Importantly, and consis-
tent with the efficient market hypothesis, the mean labor income of formal workers is
lower than that of informal workers.
In our empirical analysis, we consider all household heads aged 30 to 60 years old (prime
working age). We identify the household head based on a survey question which asks the
relationship to the household head for each individual. This status is verified in each of
the 5 waves. We focus on household heads because they are usually employed and we
do not model the decision to participate in the labor market. Our final sample includes
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Figure 3 Median after-tax labor income, formal and informal workers, 2005–2013. Note: this graph
shows the median after-tax labor income of both formal and informal workers for the period 2005–2013. The
data comes from the National Survey of Occupation and Employment (NSOE). All income measures were
deflated to 2010 pesos using the Consumer Price Index of the Mexican government. The gray bar highlights
periods of economic downturn according to Bank of Mexico.
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Table 1 Basic descriptive statistics
Informal Formal
Mean SD Mean SD
Age 44.465 8.407 43.025 7.966
Partners’ Age 40.928 9.110 40.077 8.481
Male 0.819 0.385 0.822 0.382
Male Partner 0.030 0.172 0.028 0.164
Schooling Years 7.986 4.659 11.274 4.448
Partner’s Schooling Years 4.010 5.373 5.368 6.378
Free Union 0.158 0.364 0.097 0.296
Separated 0.063 0.242 0.048 0.213
Divorced 0.027 0.163 0.040 0.195
Widowed 0.041 0.199 0.024 0.153
Married 0.639 0.480 0.705 0.456
Single 0.072 0.258 0.087 0.282
Employed Partner 0.979 0.145 0.973 0.163
Monthly Income 34,097.524 74,850.231 17,150.061 31,039.965
Note: this table contains summary statistics for household heads observed in the National Survey of Occupation and
Employment (NSOE). The statistics describe the observable characteristics of the household heads the first time they were
observed in the sample. Individuals are classified as formally employed if they have health insurance from the Mexican
Institute of Social Security or the Institute of Security and Social Services for the State Workers. In order to receive either
service, the worker must pay labor income taxes through his employer. Otherwise, he or she is classified as an informal
employee.
3 The formal and informal labor markets
Formal employment, which happens in the formal labor market, is a working relation-
ship between a employer and employee that is fully under governmental regulation and
taxation. Informal employment is any employment that does not fall under governmental
regulation and taxation.
Mexican federal labor law mandates formal employers to provide a set of fringe
benefits which are often considered to cover basic individual and family needs. This
includes maternity leave, overtime pay, disability income protection, retirement benefits,
sick leave, vacations (paid and non-paid), social security, profit sharing, and a number
of other benefits5. For this reason, we classify a household head as formally employed if
he or she works and receives health insurance and social security services through the
Mexican Institute of Social Security or the Institute of Services and Social Security for the
State Workers. The former provides services to private industry employees and the latter
to government employees. In order to receive either service, individuals must be regis-
tered as contributors and pay labor income taxes. Firms that do not register employees
are subject to a variety of fines. This registration is the only channel through which the
government learns that an employee is working6. The firm declares the labor income of
the employee, and the government taxes the firm accordingly. Then, the firm subtracts
this tax from the employee’s labor income. Notably, self-employed individuals can register
themselves as firms, pay taxes, and receive benefits as if employed by a firm.
We use the following question to define formal employment or formality: “do you have
access to medical aid in...?” If the household head answers either Mexican Institute of
Social Security or Institute of Services and Social Security for the State Workers, we con-
sider him or her to be formally employed. Figure 4 describes the participation of employed
household heads in the formal labormarket over time and over the life cycle. Participation
over time is stable for two reasons: (i) no structural changes have increased or decreased
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Figure 4 Formal employment in Mexico, 2005–2013. (a) Over Time; (b) Over the Life Cycle. Note: a
worker is formal if he has health insurance and social security services from the Mexican Institute of Social
Security or the Institute of Security and Social Services for the State Workers. In order to receive either service,
the worker must pay labor income taxes through their employer. We deflate all income measures to 2010
pesos using the Consumer Price Index of the Mexican government. The data comes from the National Survey
of Occupation and Employment (NSOE).
the participation rates in either the formal or the informal labor markets; and (ii) the
employment rate in Mexico for the period 2005–2013 is very stable: 97% of household
heads are employed with a standard deviation of 16%7.
4 Empirical strategy
Since our estimation relies on an efficient market hypothesis, our first step is to check the
extent to which it holds in our sample. If the efficient market hypothesis holds, then work-
ers should be indifferent between working in the formal and informal sectors. If this is the
case, we should observe that moving from the formal to the informal sector happens as
often as a move in the opposite direction. To check this, we divide the “switchers”, indi-
viduals who switch (in our window of observation) from one labor market to the other
without spending time as unemployed, into three different groups: i) individuals who
started in the formal sector and switched to the informal sector; ii) individuals who started
in the informal sector and switched to the formal sector; and iii) individuals who switched
across sectors several times8. Table 2 shows that 15.4% of the heads of household in our
data switch labor markets at some point. Of the switchers, 42.2% started as formal and
switched to informal, and 42.9% started as informal and switched to formal9.
Having shown that in our data, switching from informality to formality happens as often
as switching from formality to informality, we now turn to show that the labor income
of the three groups does not significantly differ. Put differently, we want to test, in order
to make our efficient market hypothesis more credible, that specific types of switches are
not associated with labor income gains. To do this, we regress a set of indicators for each
Table 2 Fraction of head of households switching sectors, 2005–2013
Mean SD
Switches 0.154 0.361
To Informal 0.424 0.494
To Formal 0.429 0.495
Note: this table shows the fraction of workers that switch from one labor market to the other between 2005–2013. The data
comes from the National Survey of Occupation and Employment (NSOE).
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type of switcher on our measures of monthly labor income. Table 3 displays the results
of these calculations under different specifications. Column 3 shows that the difference
between the labor income of the three types is close to zero.We then compute the returns
to formality of the switchers with (column 4) and without (column 2) controls for the
switcher type. Importantly, the returns to formality do not significantly differ between
these two specifications, and the coefficient is negative and significantly different from
zero – which aligns with our main empirical findings discussed next in this section.
Table 3 Linear models with switching indicators
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Formal -0.04548*** -0.04415***
(0.00382) (0.00387)
Switch to Formal 0.01523** 0.01229**
(0.00595) (0.00596)
Switch to Informal 0.00062 0.00418
(0.00588) (0.00589)
2–5 Co-workers 0.05669*** 0.06683*** 0.05704*** 0.06670***
(0.00819) (0.00826) (0.00819) (0.00826)
6–10 Co-workers -0.05050*** -0.02923*** -0.04934*** -0.02924***
(0.00865) (0.00888) (0.00865) (0.00887)
11–15 Coworkers -0.10785*** -0.08250*** -0.10643*** -0.08247***
(0.00969) (0.00998) (0.00970) (0.00998)
16–50 Co-workers -0.15065*** -0.12127*** -0.14886*** -0.12114***
(0.00813) (0.00856) (0.00814) (0.00856)
> 50 Co-workers -0.23406*** -0.20118*** -0.23181*** -0.20092***
(0.00785) (0.00836) (0.00787) (0.00836)
Age 0.24550* 0.24945* 0.23231 0.23502
(0.14679) (0.14674) (0.14727) (0.14722)
Partner’s Age -0.00326*** -0.00323*** -0.00327*** -0.00324***
(0.00036) (0.00036) (0.00036) (0.00036)
Male 0.35589*** 0.35426*** 0.35521*** 0.35365***
(0.01277) (0.01277) (0.01277) (0.01277)
Schooling Years -0.00125*** -0.00135*** -0.00123*** -0.00133***
(0.00038) (0.00038) (0.00038) (0.00038)
Free Union 0.02210 0.02158 0.02146 0.02116
(0.03150) (0.03150) (0.03149) (0.03150)
Separated 0.01780 0.01865 0.01775 0.01873
(0.04521) (0.04517) (0.04521) (0.04517)
Divorced 0.09595 0.09606 0.09626 0.09601
(0.06223) (0.06199) (0.06227) (0.06202)
Widowed 0.08004 0.07885 0.08049 0.07913
(0.10689) (0.10674) (0.10685) (0.10670)
Married -0.01402 -0.01355 -0.01444 -0.01397
(0.03129) (0.03128) (0.03128) (0.03128)
Constant 6.82986*** 6.78857*** 6.97563*** 6.94826***
(1.55758) (1.55705) (1.56306) (1.56256)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 224,584 224,584 224,584 224,584
Note 1: robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.10.
Note 2: this table displays the results of regressions of a set of indicators for each type of switcher on our measures of
monthly labor income. Column 3 shows that the difference between the labor income of the three types is close to zero. We
then compute the returns to formality of the switchers with (column 4) and without (column 2) controls for the switcher
type. The data comes from the National Survey of Occupation and Employment (NSOE).
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Since our previous exercise only considers individuals who switch sectors at some point,
we now estimate the returns to formality using the entire sample. Our estimates, under
the efficient market hypothesis and strict exogeneity10, can be interpreted as the price of
fringe benefits. We use the following linear model:
Yi,t = κ + βFi,t + λi + φt + i,t , (1)
where Yi,t and Fi,t are the monthly labor income and the formal employment status of
household head i at time t, respectively. κ is a constant, λi denotes individual fixed effects,
and φt represents time fixed effects. Since we control for all time-invariant characteris-
tics, individual transitions across markets enable us to identify the effect of formality. This
sheds light on the impact of formality on individual outcomes since most characteristics
remain fixed within our observation window, while only formality status changes. In addi-
tion, we control for other observable time-varying characteristics such as age, schooling
years, marital status, and the size of the firm in which the household head works.
5 Results
Our results are presented in Table 4, where we display various specifications adding
demographic controls and individual and time fixed effects. Our preferred estimates, in
column 5, include individual and time fixed effects and controls for the firm size11. The
coefficient of our formality indicator shows that the average effect of formality onmonthly
labor income of household heads is -8%, ceteris paribus, meaning all other household
head characteristics are fixed12. If markets are efficient, individuals with identical char-
acteristics should have the same compensation (inclusive of fringe benefits) in the formal
and informal labor markets. Thus, under that assumption, this procedure enables us to
interpret our estimates as the average monthly price of fringe benefits.
Consider the following example. Take a formally employed individual. He reports a
total labor income of $2,000 for December 2012. However, his employer provides him
with a set of fringe benefits that an informal employee does not receive. If these two
household heads only differ by formal versus informal employment, and markets are effi-
cient, an informally employed individual requires cash compensation in order to work
in the informal market. According to our estimation, an informal worker would require
$2, 000+$2, 000∗.079 to work in December 2012. Since, on average, an informal employee
earns 34,097.52 MXN (2010), a simple calculation suggests the average monthly price of
fringe benefits is 2,693 MXN (2010).
5.1 Discussion
In Mexico, firms that do not register employees as contributors are subject to a variety
of fines. If firms hiring informal workers take into account the expected cost of hiring an
informal worker, then the difference between the informal and formal labor income also
includes the expected fine employers anticipate to pay. In this case, our estimates could be
considered as a lower bound of actual fringe benefits. On the other hand, our results are
only indicative of the price of the fringe benefits mandated by Mexican law. Due to data
limitations, our strategy to price fringe benefits does not control for immediate and
delayed benefits, “longer working hours”, or job characteristics. Thus, the price we esti-
mate bundles the series of benefits described in Appendix 6 plus any other compensation
a worker requires to join either labor market sector.
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Table 4 Linear and linear fixed effects models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Formal -0.28994*** -0.09718*** -0.09673*** -0.07910***









> 50 Coworkers -0.00550
(0.00582)
Age 0.12675* 0.11209* -0.18281 -0.18171 -0.20678
(0.06850) (0.06779) (0.29515) (0.29501) (0.30130)
Partner’s Age -0.00322*** -0.00255*** -0.00548*** 0.00273 0.00208
(0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00204) (0.00261) (0.00259)
Male 0.28171*** 0.28652*** -0.39365* -0.41047** -0.39794**
(0.00550) (0.00547) (0.20355) (0.18245) (0.19731)
Schooling Years -0.00803*** 0.00060*** -0.06310* -0.06293* -0.06616*
(0.00017) (0.00018) (0.03583) (0.03439) (0.03481)
Free Union 0.08092*** 0.05709*** 0.04139 0.02703
(0.01523) (0.01512) (0.19179) (0.20179)
Married 0.01397 0.01775 -0.06259 -0.08864 -0.05447
(0.01512) (0.01502) (0.11456) (0.15395) (0.12491)






Constant 8.05017*** 8.29659*** 12.78781*** 12.24017*** 12.46080***
(0.72694) (0.71933) (3.12531) (3.12017) (3.18795)
Individual Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1,278,591 1,278,591 419,188 419,188 415,560
Note 1: robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at individual level): *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.10.
Note 2: this table shows the results of various specifications adding demographic controls and fixed effects. Our preferred
estimates, in column 5, include individual and time fixed effects and controls for the firm size. Column 3 and column 4 show
the results with and without time fixed effects. The data comes from the National Survey of Occupation and Employment
(NSOE).
6 Conclusion
Considering that 58.3% of Mexican workers are employed informally, understanding how
and why these workers choose informality is of crucial importance for policymakers who
design policies to reduce the size of this sector. To this end, in this study, we provide esti-
mates of the price of fringe benefits that formally employed household heads receive. Our
estimates are the result of combining information on monthly labor income for heads
of households and the structure of the Mexican labor market with an efficient markets
hypothesis. In particular, taking advantage of a large longitudinal dataset, we estimate
the effect of formality for heads of households who switch from one sector to the other
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between 2005 and 2013. We interpret the after-tax labor income differential we found
as the price of fringe benefits that informally employed household heads receive. Given
the size of our estimates (7.9%), future research should try to disentangle and quan-
tify the different contributions to the compensation gap between formal and informal
workers.
Endnotes
1Certain types of workers, such as undocumented immigrants, are more likely to face
obstacles to move across markets. In the Mexican context, however, undocumented
immigration plays a much smaller role than it does in developed economies. Although
there are no official statistics documenting the extent of the presence of undocumented
immigrants in the country, the National Institute for Migration estimates that around
400,000 entered the country in 2004 mainly from Central America, a large proportion of
them then transitioned to the United States (Vázquez et al. 2007).
2Ulyssea and Paes de Barros (2011) study whether the formal and informal labor
markets are segmented, i.e., if they price the observed and unobserved characteristics of
workers in a different way. Ulyssea (2010) studies how regulation affects the wage
structure, the composition, and the size of the formal and informal labor markets.
Carneiro and Henley (2001) estimate the wage functions for the formal and the informal
sectors.
3On average, we observe each household head 4.3 times (1.2 s.d.). Information which
we can provide under request shows the following: (i) the distribution of observations
over time is balanced; and (ii) age is the only observable variable that has a significant
and economically relevant correlation with the number of periods that the household
head is observed.
482% of the household heads we observe are male.
5Appendix 6 includes a full list of the benefits mandated by Mexican law. Formal
workers are recipients of these benefits.
6Unfortunately, the official registry is not public. We use self-reported status instead.
7At least two explanations can account for the shape of the participation rate in the
formal labor market over the life cycle. First, formal jobs could require higher human
capital, and older individuals suffer from human capital depreciation. Second, relatively
old individuals may take jobs in the informal sector because of more flexible schedules
that enable them to allocate time to other activities such as leisure. Both stories trace
back to old discussions in Economics literature. See Carlinger (1982) for a discussion of
labor market characteristics as the age of the individuals differ and Heckman (1976) for
a study of a life-cycle model of learning, earnings, and consumption.
8Recall that in our sample, we observe the same worker an average of 4.3 times and a
maximum of 5.
9The rest of the individuals switch more than one time across the two sectors. We
divide them in three categories to ease interpretation. Since we observe individuals at
most 5 times, there are 2 patterns which they could follow, and it is hard to analyze this
in an intuitive way. Instead, these three categories show that, in fact, two patterns
encompass all the switches. Importantly, two of the categories show evidence of similar
frequencies across switches between formality and informality and the other way around.
10Strict exogeneity is the generalization of exogeneity for the case of linear models
with longitudinal data. Mathematically, we express it as follows: E
[
εit|Fi,t
] = 0 for all
individuals i and all time periods t.
11Column 3 and column 4 show the results with and without time fixed effects. The
results do not significantly change since a large portion of the variation is explained by
the individual fixed effects.
12Heckman and Pinto (2014) explain the notion of ceteris paribus and define what
fixing means in Economics and how it differs from conditioning in Statistics.
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13Day shifts (between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m.) are 8 hours long, while night shifts (between 6
p.m. and 6 a.m.) are 7 hours long. Shifts that overlap between day and night shifts are 7.5
hours long. The hours that go beyond the shift duration are extra hours.
14As of 2013, there were seven observed holidays: (i) January the 1st, (ii) the first
Monday of February to commemorate the Constitution’s day, (iii) the third Monday
of March to commemorate the birth of Benito Juárez (Mexican president during the
19th century); (iv) Worker’s Day (May 1st); (v) Independence Day (September 16th);
(vi) the third Monday of November to commemorate the Mexican Revolution; and
(vii) Christmas (December 25th).
15Another common benefit that formal workers have, although the law does not enforce
it, is access to a savings fund which works as follows. The firm discounts a certain amount
from the worker’s labor income and invests it in a worker savings fund. For each worker,
the firm invests a similar amount from that discounted from the worker’s labor income.
This amount is called firm’s contribution. At the end of the year, the worker receives the




The complete list of the fringe benefits mandated by the federal labor law inMexico is the
following:
(a) Pregnant women do not work during twelve weeks centered around the delivery
date and preserve their job and their complete salary package
(b) Labor income is paid in cash
(c) Extra hours are paid double13
(d) In the case of job-related accidents or diseases, workers preserve their job and their
full salary package during a period that secondary laws determine in each case
(e) One day off for every six days of work with the payment of full labor income
(f) Six vacation days per year with the payment of full labor income
(g) Two additional vacation days for every year employed in the same firm, with the
payment of full labor income
(h) Two additional vacation days after the fourth year employed in the same firm,
with the payment of full labor income
(i) Two additional vacation days for every five years employed in the same firm, with
the payment of full labor income
(j) 25% vacation bonus, i.e. workers receive 125% of their labor income during
vacation days
(k) Workers receive their full labor income and do not work during observed
holidays14
(l) 30 minute break for each working shift, with the payment of full labor income
(m) 25% compensation for working on Sundays, i.e., workers receive 125% of their
labor income when they work on Sundays
(n) 15 days of additional labor income at the end of each working year
(o) 8% of the total before-tax yearly profits of the firms are divided between all its
workers. The amount that each worker receives is an increasing function of his labor
income and the number of days that he has worked in the firm the current year
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(p) Employers, employees, and the government jointly cooperate to pay for a basket of
health services provided either by the Mexican Institute of Social Security or the
Institute of Services and Social Security for the State Workers
(q) Employers, employees, and the government jointly contribute to a savings account
for retirement and housing. The three parties accumulate resources so that the
workers can both have savings for retirement and funds to buy housing. They
can access the former after retirement and the latter after a period of time that
enables them to buy a housing property through a governmental system or to
complement external savings or mortgages to buy private housing.15
Abbreviation
NSOE: National Survey of Occupation and Employment.
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